In passing, what is science?

I just read this as I was doing some research for a paper:

"Ethnographic research on the structure and culture of urban communities and some subcultural theories of crime suggest that the nature of violence is shaped, at least in part, by community characteristics. Yet, beyond these suggestive accounts, this issue has not been examined systematically in empirical research." - Baumer et al., Criminology 41(1), 2003

In other words, no observation may enter into the realm of social scientific knowledge until it has been examined statistically. Some day, I would love to put together a compelling reason to disagree.

Back from Australia

More than likely the best vacation I have ever been on. Australia is a fabulous country, the way of life is much, much slower than in America, which may have just been because I was staying in a farming community, but it was welcome nonetheless. The trip in general was just awesome. Bex and I traveled between Kiama and Sydney several times and hit up some locations a bit further inland to visit relatives. Sydney is just enormous, probably more than twice the size of greater Boston, but surprisingly the entire country has a population of around 22 million people, and 95% of them live on the East coast. I would love to go back at some point to check out the more arid areas of the outback.

Bex and I talked a lot about the prospect of moving out there for work once we are finished with our PhDs, and while at first I was reluctant, now I am totally on board, given that there will be opportunities, that is.

I got a metric fuck-ton of reading done while I was there. I brought Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra and a Marx reader, mainly to read Capital, but ended up buying several more books along the way, including A.C. Grayling's What is Good?, E.H. Carr's What is History?, and Sartre's The Age of Reason.

Just a few thoughts on those.


I loved Zarathustra, it was a great follow up to The Genealogy of Morals because while the latter was written to deconstruct "traditional" morals, Zarathustra attempted to fill the void with Nietzsche's Dionysian/individualistic morality. The lessons that I enjoyed the most were regarding self mastery. Nietzsche's conception of self mastery is mostly on an intellectual level and I feel like that is somewhat doable for me, as opposed to a physical self mastery, which I usually lack to discipline to keep up with. I also really enjoyed Nietzsche's courage to critique any idea, no matter how widely held or regarded. In the late 1800s (and today for that matter), arguing against utilitarianism must have appeared very daunting. Today, while I can appreciate the veracity of Nietzsche's conviction on utilitaranism, I imagine it would be very difficult, in a practical sense, to avoid using the philosophy of maximizing the pleasure of most while minimizing pain.

Relatedly, I enjoyed Grayling's What is Good?, mainly for approaching the issue as a question to be explored, rather than a definative, unalterable list of "thou shalts". In the end, the book felt a little shallow, mostly for the obvious vehemence that Grayling feels towards morality and ethics based on otherworldly beings, but I suppose I should have known what I was going to get from a good friend of Dawkins.

Reading Capital was pretty difficult, and I'm sure many of the harder parts were left out of the reader. What I enjoyed most about the book was Marx's method, what he considered to be social science. Concerning a subject, in this case capitalism, Marx starts at the beginning. Not chronologically, but with the simplest fundamental pieces of capital. He begins with a general statement on a definition of capitalism and then moves from concept to concept and their interrelations until he is discussing capital in it's entirety (he begins with 'what is a commodity?' and moves to 'what is value?').

Marx's analysis today, if it were produced to be part of the modern social science industry, would probably be considered "a conceptual piece", and thus "not real science" meaning that it would not be considered to present "scientific knowledge" until Marx's methodology was scrutinized and his assertions became subject to large-scale statistical analysis using a presumably representive dataset. Not being an economist, I am unfamiliar with the extent to which this has been done in modern econometrics, so maybe I am speaking out of ignorance and pessimism.

An important lesson I pulled from Capital (and The Genealogy of Morals, once I recognized the lesson) was the sheer importance of a historical outlook in social science. Marx rightly criticized capitalistic economists for analyzing capitalism ahistorically. This meant that they considered modern features of capitalism to either be eternal, in that they actually have been in place for all of human history, or eternal in the sense that capitalism was seen as a very real "thing", an idea which was destined to be put into power, people just needed to "discover" it (what Mills would call a 'Concept' with a capital 'C').

Thinking about this (and lack of other books) led me to get What is History? and I enjoyed it as much as I did The Sociological Imagination. The two books really mirror each other, but do not cite one another as they were both written around the same time. The important ideas I pulled from Carr's book regarded relativism and objectivity in the social sciences. I'll write a bit on those later, it's breakfast time.

Time to catch up

It's not that I haven't been finding things to write about, but I have been busy finalizing two publications, playing The Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion obsessively, and getting ready to depart for Australia.

I finished Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals and was very happy with my introduction to his writing. Nietzsche presented some interesting perspectives on atheism which I had no been exposed to through more recent works. A very interesting take came from Nietzsche's thoughts on a possible origin of God. He posited that ancient peoples may have seen themselves as being in debt to their ancestors (ironically this seems rather Darwinian) in that they survived, established societies, and other amenities that modern people enjoy. To that extent, the debt that a people owe to their ancestors may take the form of rules (i.e., I ought to act in such a way, i owe it to my ancestors). After some time, the debt one owes to their ancestors becomes seen as unpayable, the ancestor becoming so powerful they are deified.

Nietzsche goes on to say that with Christianity, the debt people felt they owed to God became so great that the creators of the religion saw that the only one capable of paying the debt was God himself. So he pays himself with a pound of his own flesh.

What Nietzsche does not go on to say is that this act really did not pay off any of the debt that humans owed to God, instead, it made it greater than ever. Like the government bailing out the auto industry, God was then in complete ownership of the actions of mankind. Given the sacrifice* that he had made for humans, they would now have to pay an immense fine for refusing to follow his commands. This is the point (the New Testament) when the concept of hell is introduced.

*As Christopher Hitchens points out, the idea of the crucifixion as being a sacrifice for which I owe God an immense amount is simply ridiculous. The Bible, if it is to be believed, is clear in that Jesus comes back from the dead. Jesus - being the son of God, and presumably sharing some of his powers (i.e., omniscience) - probably knew that he would return to life following his execution. Furthermore, Jesus knew that I would later be an atheist and reject his sacrafice, whether he did it or not. To that extent, I owe him nothing.

Anyways, I enjoyed the book so much that I bought Thus Spoke Zarathustra and will be reading that along with a chuck of Marx's Capital while I am abroad.

For other recent reading, I am almost done with Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Though Kuhn writes mostly about natural science, I am trying to relate what I am reading to social science, specifically criminal justice and criminology. So far, I am not sure that I have found much of use (I am probably missing a ton, I'm still new at this philosophy stuff), mostly because criminal justice is probably in a pre-paradigm stage. I wonder, however, if there could ever be a successful paradigm for studies of human behavior. I wonder if the scope of "laws" of behavior would have to be reduced to capture at least a central tendency.

Nietzsche on punishment, guilt

Every time I sit down to read Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals I am a little more glad that I decided to buy it. In the section I just finished, Nietzsche discusses some CJ related concepts in punishment and guilt, or "bad conscience".

At several points in both undergrad and grad school, the "goals" or "philosophies" of punishment have been discussed. In essence, these goals are the utilities of various forms of punishment. They are typically listed as being retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and more recently, restoration. Nietzsche's first point on these utilities is that they are really the ends of the punishment, regardless of the means, but that these ends should not be confused with the origin of various punishments. The reason for this, he argues, is that the fact that anything has a utility to an end is an indication that it has been "put to a new purpose by a force superior to itself". This is too much of a blanket statement for my liking, but I believe the general point is a valid one. That one should not confuse an object's present utility as the reason for it's origin. Punishment, over time, has mutated as it has been legally monopolized by the state.

The next point that Nietzsche touches on is that these utilities of punishment are not mutually exclusive, in that they arise in an "uncertain, supplementary, and accidental nature." To illustrate, he provides several examples. As he provided them, I wrote out which of these utilities were covered by each example. Here are only a few.

• Punishment as rendering the criminal harmless and incapable of further injury. This is fairly straight-forward, incapacitation.
  
• Punishment as a compenstation for the injury sustained by the injured party, in any form whatsoever. This example mostly concerns retribution, but may also apply to restoration. In that "compensation" may be the reforming of broken bonds.
  
• Punishment as a means of inspiring fear of those who determine and execute the punishment. I immediately thought of general deterrence, but there is a special exception here. General deterrence typically refers to a fear of the punishment which corresponds with the particular offense, not specifically the fear of those who deliver the punishment.
  
• Punishment as a kind of compensation for advantages which the wrongdoer has up to that time enjoyed. This seems to refer both retribution and specific deterrence, in that imprisonment is seen as the "cost" for violating the social contract, under which the prisoner had enjoyed above all, freedom.

The final point I wanted to touch on was what Neitzsche felt about the effectiveness of punishment, as that is still very relevant in CJ today. Perhaps somewhat ahead of his time in recognizing this, Nietzsche points out that punishments as they existed then (and today), do not appear to be effective deterrents of re-offending. The reason for this, he posits, is because punishments as they are carried out by the state do not induce genuine guilt, remorse, or "bad consicence" on the behalf of the punished. Rather, physical punishments harden and numb individuals, sharpening the more negative aspects of their personalities. Part of the reason for this takes on something of a modern critical criminology perspective. He argues that punishments do not induce genuine guilt because of hypocrisy on behalf of the punisher. The offender witnesses some of the offenses for which he is to be punished - stealing, bribery, murder - being carried out "legitimately" by actors of the state (the police, the military, politicians, etc.). Thus, as the offender is punished they do not see themselves being punished for an act which is worthy of such punishment intrinsically, but rather only by certain individuals in certain contexts.

*shudder* Matsuzaka is pitching tonight

I'm going to Comerica Park tomorrow night to catch the Red Sox while they are in town, and I am really glad that we're getting Dice-K's start out of the way the night before. I almost completely agree with Bob Ryan's recent article in the Globe, he is just frustrating to watch, physically painful even. Go ahead, start every inning with the bases loaded and a 3-2 count on the batter. Here's my prediction for his pitching line tonight:

5.0 IP 12 H 3 ER 10 BB 7 K (110 pitches; 40 strikes, 70 balls)

He is a nibbler, and I just can't stand it. He gets two strikes on each batter, and then throws every pitch after that point just inches off the plate, trying to get the batter to chase. You get two strikes on the guy, finish him off! C'mon man! Some fans come back with "well, he went 18-3 in 2008. That's pretty good." I can't argue with that, it's true, that's a great win/loss ratio. But the guy averaged less than 6 IP per start in 2008. He struck out only 1.6 batters for every batter he walked, compared to 2.3 for Lester, 5.1 for Beckett, and 2.0 for Wakefield (and he's a knuckleballer!).

This guy could be so much better. Just put a shock collar on him that gives him a stiff jolt if he throws a ball.

Just started Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morals"

I've only made it about 13 pages into this book, but I really need to write some of this down to try and understand it.

So far, Nietzsche has stated that his goal is to analyze, in a historical sense, the etymology of "good" and "bad". Philosophers to date (contemporary 1887) he argues, have taken the meanings of "good" and "evil" for granted, assuming that things which are typically considered good (e.g., altruism) have always been considered good, or are intrinsically good.

In examining language describing things as "good", Nietzsche found that the root of these words across numerous languages (he is not specific as to which languages besides English and German) is actually "aristocrat". He argues that the aristocratic - those able to behave altruistically - had the power to define their actions as "useful", which became synonymous with that which is "good". Conversely, the root of "bad" lies within words describing the "plebeian", the "vulgar", and the "low".

Following this point, Nietzsche argues that the rise of the Judeo-Christian religion represents a moral "revolt", whereas the "vulgar", "low", and the "plebeian" reversed the meanings of "good" and "bad" by emphasizing the meek, the down-trodden, and the poor. He claims that this revolt, or revenge, is not apparent to those without a historical sense, because it has achieved victory.

---

I had some confusion in trying to gauge where Nietzsche was going with his argument, given that I am reading his book 120 years later. As he was describing the origin of "good" among the powerful - given contemporary distrust towards the rich and the powerful - I was thinking that perhaps he was prodding at the illegitimacy of definitions of "good" and "bad" coming from the well-to-do. However, after his scathing description of the Judeo-Christian moral revolt, I am not so sure. I am also not sure if this is even an important point to dwell on - perhaps I should be staying away from adjectives and sticking to facts until I get a better handle on the context through Nietzsche is describing the genealogy of morals.

The curious case of "fine-tuning" in the Universe

A phrase or argument which often gets tossed around in conversations regarding the existence of god is "fine-tuning" (e.g. in this article from the Discovery Institute). The phrase is typically used to state, very simply, that the Universe exhibits signs of extreme "tuning" in that if particular mathematical constants were at even a slightly different value than they currently are, then life, as we know it, would not exist. Thus, the Universe has been manipulated for the purpose of life existing as we know it, which is also why the "fine-tuning" argument has often been called the anthropic principle.

Richard Dawkins has said that, to him, this is a somewhat persuasive argument for a scientific basis for god's existence. Perhaps I'm too new at this sort of thing, but I honestly never found the argument very persuasive. Here's why...

These particular "life-enabling" mathematical constants are few in number, they number about a dozen, among hundreds of other constants. They include the speed of light, Planck's constant, Newton's gravitational constant, the ratio of electromagnetic force to gravitational force, and a few others. Proponents of the fine-tuning argument state that if any of these figures was even slightly different, life as we know it would not exist. Positing this statement seems to beg the question of whether these numbers could be any different than they are. Proponents seem to assume that these numbers are manipulatable - by a deity, at least - and thus the fact that they are what they are is something of incredible luck for humans. It seems to me that proponents of fine-tuning have not demonstrated that these numbers are "tunable." An example here is helpful. A mathematical constant which is not included in the fine-tuning arugment is Pi, the ratio of any circle's circumference to its diameter. One could state that "if pi were any value other than 3.14..., circles as we know them would not exist." This, while true, seems rather silly. Could pi really be any other value? Do we have god's benevolence to thank, in that he allowed circles to be circles by making pi precisely the value it is?

That reasoning aside, Bertrand Russell was the one who put the nail in the coffin in the fine-tuning arugment for me, and he did so more than 50 years ago. He considered god handing down edicts as natural laws in Why I am Not a Christian, and in doing so stated the following...

If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others (e.g., the life-enabling mathematical constants)-- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there were a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary. You really have a law outside and anterior to the divine edicts, and God does not serve your purpose, because he is not the ultimate lawgiver.

In other words, in assigning particular values to the mathematical constants, god was following laws external to himself (which stated that constants would have to be x,y, and z), when, according to proponents of the fine-tuning arugement, god supposedly is the one who made all of these laws in the first place. Chalking the mathematical constants up to god is therefore not even a superficial explanation -- it is no explanation at all.

A brief introduction...

...to a blog which, in all honestly, will be a difficult thing to sustain. I've tried to keep a livejournal in the past and have failed miserably, but I am hoping to turn things around here. I have reason to be hopeful, this time I'm writing with something of a purpose. This blog will be a place where I will collect my thoughts regarding just about anything, but especially messages from the books that I am reading - pretty heady stuff, which I typically have a hard time holding onto unless I write them down somewhere.

I also hope to use this blog to chronicle my experiece as a graduate student, just stepping into the final throwes of my formal education, which has always been something which I have considered extremely important, but admitedly, did not fully understand the process. Recently, by getting involved, by observing, and reading, I've come to see how "the game" is played - not all disciplines are created equal.

On that note, from my undergrad, to my masters, and now to my Ph.D., I have been enrolled as a student in criminal justice. One of the toughest lessons I have attempted to grasp is exactly what is CJ's identity as an academic discipline, and how does that influence the work and potential of students who enroll in such a program. I've recently come to tackle these questions head on by reading C. Wright Mills' critique of social science in The Sociological Imagination, and was struck most by this quote, describing 'research technicians' in the social sciences:

They have taken up social research as a career; they have come early to an extreme specialization, and they have acquired an indifference or contempt for 'social philosophy' -which means to them 'writing books out of books' or 'merely speculating.' Listening to their conversations, trying to gague the quality of their curiosity one finds a deadly limitation of mind. The social worlds about which so many scholars feel ignorant do not puzzle them.

I truly do not want to become a 'technician' such as this, but is this not how academics make a living these days? Is this not 'the game?' This is stuff that really interests me, and that hopefully I can understand (read: avoid for myself) as I continue my own education.